本研究從兩個角度探討在強制採用XBRL的背景下，財務報表資訊之可比性增強後，能否降低代理問題。美國證管會於2009年開始推動強制申報可延伸企業報告語言 (eXtensible Business Reporting Language)法案，分階段實施以XBRL作為企業財報之共通語言。XBRL以可延伸標記式語言的技術，運用標籤來標記資料，降低了資訊處理人力與成本並增進資料處理的效率，更容易進行企業間資料的比較與分析。
本文第一部分從多角化公司的內部資本市場探討之，分析強制採用XBRL對美國多角化公司的內部資本市場效率之影響，實證結果發現採用XBRL能提高內部資本市場效率，並進一步證實代理問題較高的公司，其內部資本市場提升幅度更明顯。此外，XBRL期間內部資本市場效率與負超額價值具相關性，亦即強制採用XBRL後，外部市場更容易偵測公司內部資本市場的無效率並給予負面評價，呼應內部資本市場效率提升係因採用XBRL申報所帶來之監督效益。
本文第二部分從總經理的超額薪酬進行探討。過去三十年來大公司總經理薪酬的增加幅度驚人，而異常高額薪酬反映了公司治理失靈。因此，本文以美國公開發行公司為研究對象，檢測強制採用XBRL申報對總經理超額薪酬之影響，實證結果發現，XBRL期間總經理薪酬的超額情況確有減緩，且相較於代理問題低的公司，代理問題較嚴重的公司其總經理超額薪酬降低之情況更為顯著。
整體研究結果顯示，採用XBRL申報期間內部資本市場更具效率、總經理超額薪酬顯著降低，代表採用XBRL後財務報表資訊可比性提高，強化市場對經理人行動與績效的審查與透明度，投資人的資訊環境提升進而增強外部監督力量，有助於減輕經理人與股東之間的代理問題。

This study explores from two perspectives whether enhanced the comparability of financial statement information can mitigate agency problem in the context of mandatory adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language) which SEC began to implement in 2009. XBRL provides a standard language for reporting financial information. XBRL is a type of XML (extensible markup language), and uses tags to identify each piece of financial data, which reduces the cost of information processing and increase the efficiency of data processing. XBRL makes it easier to compare and analyze data between enterprises.

The first part of this paper studies the impact of mandatory adoption of XBRL on the internal capital market efficiency of American diversified companies. Empirical results show that mandatory adoption of XBRL is associated with improvement in internal capital market efficiency. Specifically, increased efficiency of internal capital market is more obvious in companies with higher agency problems. In addition, we find that internal capital market efficiency and negative excess value are related during XBRL. After the mandatory adoption of XBRL, it is easier for investors to detect the inefficiency of the company's internal capital market and then give negative evaluation, which means that the improved efficiency of the internal capital market is due to the monitoring benefits of XBRL.

In the past three decades, the CEO’s compensation has increased greatly, while the abnormally high compensation reflects the failure of corporate governance. Thus, the second part of this paper discusses the impact of mandatory adoption of XBRL on CEO excess compensation. Our results indicate that mandatory adoption of XBRL is negatively associated with CEO excess compensation. Further, reduction of CEO excess compensation is more significant for companies with higher agency problems.

The overall results suggest that the internal capital market is more efficient and CEO excess salary is significantly reduced during XBRL. After the mandatory adoption of XBRL, the comparability of financial statement information is enhanced, the investor's information environment is improved, and then the agency problem between managers and shareholder is reduced.

第一部分 強制採用XBRL與內部資本市場效率之研究
第壹章 緒論 1
第貳章 文獻回顧與假說建立 5
第二節 內部資本市場效率 7
第三節 內部資本市場效率與XBRL 8
第參章 研究設計 11
第一節 資料來源與樣本選擇 12
第二節 變數定義 12
第三節 實證模型 14
第肆章 實證結果 16
第一節 敘述性統計 17
第二節 主要實證結果 20
第三節 額外性測試 27
第伍章 結論 32

第二部分 強制採用XBRL與總經理超額薪酬之研究
第壹章 緒論 33
第貳章 文獻回顧與假說建立 36
第一節 XBRL背景與文獻 36
第二節 超額薪酬 37
第三節 強制採用XBRL與超額薪酬 39
第參章 研究設計 41
第一節 變數定義 42
第二節 資料來源與研究期間 42
第三節 實證模型 43
第肆章 實證結果 45
第一節 敘述性統計 45
第二節 主要實證結果 49
第伍章 結論 54
參考文獻 55

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