我國財務會計準則第41號公報「營運部門資訊之揭露」規範企業應提供部門別報導於財務報表使用者。此一公報乃參考國際財務報告準則第八號規定(IFRS 8)，企業必須採用管理法揭露部門別資訊，以強化公司資訊透明度。因財務會計準則第41號公報規定適用日期為2011年1月1日，故本研究以台灣2011年至2017年之上市櫃公司作為樣本區間，以探討部門別報導品質與分析師預測誤差之關聯性。並進一步探討，董事會特性是否會影響部門別報導品質與分析師預測誤差之間的關聯性。研究結果發現，部門別報導品質因衡量方式為銷貨成長率之差異，亦即營業部門之性質具差異性，使營運複雜程度提升，導致分析師對資訊掌握度減少，造成盈餘預測誤差擴大。另外，在探討董事會特性的影響後發現，當董事會監督有效性愈好，將加強部門別報導品質與分析師預測誤差之間的負向關聯。

GAAP No. 41 regulates enterprises to provide segement reporting to users of financial statements.The GAAP NO. 41 refers to the Standard IFRS 8, Operating Segments, that is, companies must adopt management methods to expose segement information to enhance corporate information transparency. Therefore, this study uses the publicly-traded firms in Taiwan from 2011 to 2017 as sample intervals to explore the correlation between segment reporting quality and analyst forecasting error. And further explore whether the role of the board characteristics will affect the correlation between the quality of the segment reporting and analyst forecasting error.The result show that The quality of the segment reporting is measured by the difference in the growth rate of sales, that is, the nature of the operating segments is different, which increases the complexity of the operation, resulting in the decrease of the information mastery of the analysts and causing the earning forecast error to expand.In addition, Considering the impact of the board characteristics, empirical evidence shows that the better the effectiveness of board supervision, the stronger the negative correlation between segment reporting quality and analyst forecasting error.

壹、緒論.............................................1
一、研究背景與目地....................................1
二、研究預期貢獻......................................4
貳、文獻回顧..........................................7
一、分析師預測誤差.....................................7
二、分析師預測誤差之決定因素............................8
三、部門別報導品質....................................10
四、董事會特性.......................................15
參、假說發展與研究設計...............................19
一、部門別報導品質與分析師預測誤差.....................19
二、董事會特性、對部門別報導品質與分析師預測誤差之影響..20
三、研究設計.........................................22
1.檢測模型...........................................22
2.變數定義...........................................24
四、資料來源與樣本篩選..................................30
肆、實證結果分析......................................33
一、敘述性統計........................................33
二、相關係數分析......................................37
三、實證結果..........................................41
四、額外測試.........................................48
伍、研究結論與建議....................................57
參考文獻..............................................59

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