在現今的競爭環境下，企業若是無法提供新的產品或服務，可能就無法有效的提升經營績效，此類型的議題中，已經有多位學者提出建議，可藉由供應鏈成員之間的合作機制，以增加利潤作為誘因，進一步去加強供應鏈成員彼此之間的合作。

本研究以斯塔克伯格賽局理論(Stackelberg game)作為基礎，考量單一供應商及多個零售商之情境，其中供應商是供應鏈中的領導者，而零售商在供應鏈中扮演追隨者的角色。本研究的合作機制是參考Mishra (2004)對Viswanathan and Piplani (2001)所提出的共同補貨週期(Common Replenishment Epoch; CRE)之延伸，Mishra (2004)提出的選擇性折扣(Selective discount)之概念，以供應商利潤極大化為前提，來做為零售商是否參加共同補貨週期的篩選，因此並不一定所有的零售商都會加入到此合作機制中，也可能發生個別處理的情況。

在Viswanathan and Piplani (2001)所提出的共同補貨週期政策中，供應商與零售商的需求量為固定值，為了探討不同的需求量，對於供應商及零售商雙方利潤的影響，在本研究中，將加入Baker and Urban (1988)需求速度相依於存貨水準之模式，藉由調整需求彈性係數來觀察，使用共同補貨週期前後，供應商及零售商雙方利潤之變化與影響。

In today’s competitive environment, firms may not be able to effectively increase their business performance if they cannot provide new products or services. Regarding to this issue, a number of scholars have suggested that a collaborative mechanism between supply chain members can be a solution, where profit gains are an incentive that can further promote the collaboration between supply chain members.

Based on the Stackelberg game theory, this study considers a context with one single supplier and multiple buyers, where the supplier is the leader and the buyers are the followers in the supply chain. The collaborative mechanism is based on the model that Mishra (2004) extends the Common Replenishment Epoch (CRE) introduced by Viswanathan and Piplani (2001). Mishra (2004) proposes the selective discount concept, which is to select vendors for common replenishment based on the maximum profit for the supplier. Therefore, not all the buyers will participate in the collaborative mechanism, and some buyers may need an individual arrangement.

In Viswanathan and Piplani’s (2001) CRE policy, suppliers’ and buyers’ demands are held constant. To investigate the effects of varied demand levels on the profits for suppliers and buyers, this study integrates Baker and Urban’s (1988) model with a stock-level-dependent demand rate. By adjusting the demand elasticity coefficient, this study observes changes in the profit for suppliers and the profit for buyers before and after CRE.

致謝 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
附錄目錄 IX
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究目標 2
1.3 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 斯塔克伯格賽局理論(Stackelberg Game) 5
2.2 協同合作交流機制 7
2.3 存貨相依需求 9
第三章 數學模型之建立與問題描述 11
3.1 模型發展 11
3.1.1 基礎符號定義 13
3.1.2 需求及存貨水準分析 14
3.1.3 零售商之需求量分析 15
3.1.4 零售商存貨成本分析 15
3.2 Non-CRE符號定義及模型分析 17
3.2.1 Non-CRE模型 18
3.3 CRE-VP符號定義與模型分析 21
3.3.1 CRE-VP符號定義及模型 21
3.3.2 CRE-VP模型分析 24
3.4 CRE-SD符號定義與模型分析 31
3.4.1 CRE-VP符號定義及模型 31
3.4.2 CRE-SD模型分析 33
第四章案例分析 37
4.1 參數值設定 37
4.2 供應商與零售商在non-CRE模式之利潤分析 38
4.2.1 供應商在non-CRE模式之利潤分析 38
4.2.2 零售商在non-CRE模式之利潤分析 39
4.3 供應商與零售商在CRE-VP之利潤分析 44
4.3.1 供應商在CRE-VP之利潤分析 44
4.3.2 零售商在CRE-VP之利潤分析 45
4.4 供應商與零售商在CRE-SD之利潤分析 51
4.4.1 供應商在CRE-SD之利潤分析 51
4.4.2 零售商在CRE-SD之利潤分析 53
4.5 CRE-VP與 Non-CRE之利潤比較 57
4.5.1 供應商在CRE-VP與 Non-CRE之利潤比較 57
4.5.2 零售商在CRE-VP與 Non-CRE之利潤比較 58
4.6 CRE-SD與 CRE-VP之利潤比較 61
4.6.1 供應商在CRE-SD與CRE-VP之利潤比較 61
4.6.2 零售商在CRE-SD與CRE-VP之利潤比較 65
4.7 小結 71
第五章結論及建議 73
5.1 結論 73
5.2 未來建議 74
參考資料 75

中文文獻
黃鎮霖(2016)，存貨相依需求對二階通路共同補貨週期之影響，國立東華大學全球管理運籌研究所碩士學位論文，花蓮
蘇雄義(2012)，「供應鏈管理—原理、程序、實務」，台北智勝文化有限公司。
英文文獻
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