過去文獻指出大眾傳媒係屬外部治理機制之一，能有效降低代理成本。本研究以2013年到2016年臺灣上市上櫃公司為樣本，並以臺灣公司治理評鑑結果為公司治理表現之代理變數，旨在探討負面事件媒體報導與公司治理之關聯性。實證結果發現負面事件媒體報導能促使企業擁有好的公司治理表現。然而本研究亦發現已接受公司治理評鑑之企業，於次期之負面媒體報導並不會減少，此一現象顯示企業可能透過優秀的公司治理表現，行公司印象之管理。若企業未真實改善其負面事件相關之情況，即使公司擁有優秀的治理表現亦不能減少媒體對負面事件之關注。

Previous literature indicates that media acts as an external governance mechanism in reducing agency cost. Using the Corporate Governance Evaluation results in Taiwan, this study examines the association between negative media reporting on corporate events and corporate governance for listed firms in Taiwan from 2013 to 2016. Empirical results reveal that negative media reporting will lead to a better corporate governance in subsequent years. However, this study finds that firms with good corporate governance still receive significantly more negative reporting in the subsequent years. After negative media reporting, firms are eager to have better corporate governance for possible impression management. Such endeavors do not release firms from negative media reporting if conditions for negative events persist.

Chapter I. Introduction 1
Chapter II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 5
2.1 The Corporate Governance Evaluation System in Taiwan 5
2.2 Corporate Governance 7
2.3 Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events 8
Chapter III. Research Methodology 13
3.1 Data Source and Sample Selection 13
3.2 Regression Model 14
3.3 Measure of Variable 15
3.3.1 Measure of Corporate Governance 15
3.3.2 Measure of Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events 16
3.3.3 Measures of Control Variables 16
Chapter IV. Analyses and Results 19
4.1 Analyses of Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events 19
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 20
4.3 Correlation Analyses 20
4.4 Regression Results 24
4.5 Sensitivity Analyses 29
4.5.1 Exclude Others Type of Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events 29
4.5.2 Exclude Lawsuit Related Type of Negative Reporting on Corporate Events 29
4.5.3 Natural Logarithm of Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events 29
4.5.4 The Variation of Negative Media Reporting on Corporate Events
29
Chapter V. Conclusion 37
5.1 Conclusions 37
5.2 Limitations 38
5.3 Future Studies 38
Reference 41

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