在各種類型的公司資產中，現金是最容易取得並受管理團隊操縱的資產。雖然現
金持有可以增加公司的價值，但持有超額現金可能會導致更多的代理問題，尤其是當
經理人具有過於自信時。我們假設良好的公司治理應該能夠緩解代理問題並節省公司
現金持有的價值。因此，本研究探討了公司治理對經理人過度自信下現金持有價值的
影響。本研究以臺灣779 家上市公司為樣本，並運用臺灣證券交易所的代表性公司治
理排名進行分析。實證結果表明，在管理者過度自信下，每多增加一元的現金持有量，
公司治理良好的企業其現金持有量增加了0.546 元，而公司治理較差之企業只有0.342
元。

Among various types of corporate assets, cash is easier-obtained and more likely to be manipulated by the management team. Although cash holdings can increase the value of the company, holding excess cash may cause more agency problems in particular when the manager is overconfident. We hypothesize that good corporate governance should be able to alleviate agency problems and save the value of corporate cash holdings. This study, therefore, examines the impact of corporate governance on the value of cash holdings under the manager's overconfidence. By 779 public-listed companies in Taiwan as the sample, this study uses the representative corporate governance ranking executed by the Taiwan Stock Exchange to perform the analysis. The empirical findings show that, under the managerial overconfidence, for one New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) cash holding increase, the value of cash holding increases by 0.546 NTD for the well-governed companies and only 0.342 NTD for the companies with weak governance.

第壹章、緒論 1
一、研究動機 1
二、研究目的 3
第貳章、文獻回顧與假說發展 5
一、代理問題與過度自信 5
二、公司治理 6
第參章、研究設計 9
一、樣本資料 9
二、實證模型 9
第肆章、實證結果與分析 13
一、敘述統計 13
二、迴歸實證結果 14
第伍章、結論與建議 17
參考文獻 19

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