良好的公司治理是將股東權益擺在首位。在台灣，公司高層多以控制股東為最終控制者，公司控制者容易將自身利益最大化，使股東權益受到損害。在保護股東制度上若無法令強制規定，普遍不會主動制定保護股東相關條款。隨著近年來股東行動主義意識抬頭，股東權益受到重視，我國政府近幾年對於董事選舉做出一些變革，例如：增設獨立董事及委託書與電子投票，提名制與逐案票決卻尚未強制規定，凸顯出法令的不完善。在董事會特性方面，過去關於董事會代理問題之相關研究文獻多半聚焦於董事會組成對公司之影響，對於董事產生之董事選舉較少著墨。因此本研究以董事選舉作為研究場景。探討公司治理制度先行及董事會特性對董事選舉董事候選人之外部股東支持度之影響。
本研究以台灣上市公司為研究樣本，資料來源取自台灣經濟新報資料庫 (TEJ) 及機構投資者股務機構 (Institutional Investor Service)。研究期間為西元2013年至2015年，涵蓋933間上市公司。本研究採用一般迴歸模型作為分析方法。採用2013年至2015年上市公司董事選舉之董事候選人一人一案共計6,545筆觀察值為分析單位。研究結果顯示，採行提名制與逐案票決制度對外部股東支持度有正向影響，內部董事比率對外部股東支持度呈負向影響，控制者的控制權與股權之偏離程度對外部股東支持度呈正向影響。本研究在公司治理外部股東支持度之領域，提供讀者在制度先行及董事會特性對外部股東在董事選舉之支持度作為重要管理意涵。

The first priority of effective corporate governance is enhancement of shareholders’ equity. In Taiwan, the board meeting holds the final say in making corporate decisions since most of the company management is comprised of controlling shareholders. On most cases, there are no rules or regulations for protecting external shareholders. The senior management won’t voluntarily make any mechanism for protecting external shareholders’ interests. Out of selfish interests, the controlling shareholders may take advantage of external shareholders, hurting their interests. With the rising shareholder activism over the years, protection of external shareholders’ equity is getting more relevant. Taiwan supervising authorities have made some changes to the rules of electing board directors. The changes include but not exclude setup of independent board directors, power of attorney for attending shareholders meeting and electronic voting. However, nomination of board directors and voting case by case are not yet put into law, which tells that the law still leaves too much to be desired. In the past, the study of board fiduciary duty has put too much emphasis on the composition of the board instead of election process of directors. Therefore, this study focuses on the election of board directors through examining level of support from external shareholders. Companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange are the study samples while related data are from Taiwan Economic Journal and Institutional Investor Service. The research period is 2013 through 2015 with 933 listed companies being included in the sample. The analysis method is regression modelling. Level of support from external shareholders is observed by 6,545 director nominee voting proposals between 2013 and 2015. The research result shows that, while the ratio of internal directors has negative effect on the level of external shareholders’ support, nomination process and voting case by case have positive effect on level of external shareholders’ support. Deviation effect has positive effect on the level of external shareholders’ support. In the field of corporate governance external shareholder support. This study provides readers with an important management meaning in early adoption of mandates and board characteristics at support of external shareholders in the election of directors.

摘要 II
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與問題 5
第三節 研究流程 8
第二章 文獻回顧與假說推導 11
第一節 理論基礎 11
第二節 文獻探討 17
第三節 假說推導 30
第三章 研究方法 39
第一節 研究架構 39
第二節 資料來源與樣本選擇 40
第三節 變數定義與衡量 42
第四節 資料分析方法 53
第四章 實證結果與討論 55
第一節 樣本描述 55
第二節 迴歸分析與假說檢定結果 58
第三節 統計分析結果討論 63
第五章 研究結論與建議 69
第一節 研究結論 69
第二節 理論貢獻與管理意涵 70
第三節 後續研究建議 74
參考文獻 75
附錄 84

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