本研究基於Stackelberg賽局，研究了一個單一供應商多零售商的分銷通路，其中供應商是領導者，零售商是追隨者。供應商可以依據零售商的成本結構、市場條件來制定批發價以追求利潤最大化。而在不同的共同補貨週期(CRE)之下，各自零售商所形成的訂購週期會對供應商產生不同的需求模式及利潤。供應商會依照由零售商訂購所形成的需求模式，去向上游供應商訂購。因此，考量供應商本身的存貨成本，及在不同補貨週期之下供應商的利潤及需求模式，供應商會決定適合的存貨策略以使自身利益最大化。而零售商的需求量會依供應商所給的批發價而變動，透過制定零售價及決定向供應商訂購的數量來追求自身利潤最大化。因此，分銷通路成本的總收入由兩部分組成:供應商和零售商。利用供應商的存貨策略，本研究首先根據零售商採用CRE之下的最佳選擇，使供應商的利潤最大化。為了便於比較，本研究還審視了供應商在零售商不採用CRE策略下的最大利潤，即零售商將根據各自的EOQ原則下訂。
實驗數據分析上，我們設置不同的供應商訂購成本及聯合訂購處理成本加以比較其對存貨策略的影響。並得出供應商的訂購成本對存貨策略的制定有著顯著影響，當供應商訂購成本越大時，進行整合後所選擇的共同補貨週期也會越大。並且當供應商在訂購成本越大的情況下，相較於未整合前的獲利，整合後供應商獲利會提高更多百分比。並透過改變零售商價格彈性以查看不同的彈性係數下供應商及零售商的變化。在零售商價格彈性偏低時，供應商較容易進行協調，而在價格彈性偏高時，供應商的利潤下降至微乎其微，也難以透過整合供應鏈來提升獲利。而零售商在價格彈性偏低時，經整合後獲利皆會微幅下降。在價格彈性偏高時，經整合後獲利會大幅上升。

This research studies a single-supplier multi-retailer distribution channel in which the supplier is the leader and retailers are the followers based on the Stackelberg game. The supplier maximizes profit through setting wholesale prices on the basis of the retailer's cost structure and market conditions. Under different Common Replenishment Epochs (CRE), each retailer forms an order interval that generates different demand patterns and profit for the supplier. The supplier will order from an upstream supplier according to the demand pattern formed by the retailer's order. Therefore, taking the supplier's inventory costs, profit, and demand patterns into account under different common replenishment epochs, the supplier will determine an appropriate inventory strategy to maximize his profit. The retailer's demand varies according to the wholesale price given by the supplier. The retailers maximize their profit by setting the retail price and deciding the quantity to order from the supplier. Thus, the total revenue of the distribution channel cost consists of two parts: the supplier and the retailers. Using the supplier’s inventory strategy, this research first maximizes the supplier’s profit, based on the best choice of CRE from the retailers, and then maximizes the supplier’s profit based on all possible CREs offered by the supplier. For the comparison purpose, this research also reviews the supplier’s maximum profits if the retailers do not apply CRE strategy, i.e., the retailers will release their orders based on their individual EOQ.
In the numerical experiment analysis, we set different supplier's order costs and joint order processing costs to compare their impact on inventory policy. It is found that the supplier's order cost has a significant effect on the inventory strategy, the larger the supplier's order cost, the larger the common replenishment epochs selected after coordination. Also, the larger the order cost to be, the more significant the percentage increase in the profit of the coordinated supplier compared to the profit of the uncoordinated supplier. Alter retailer price elasticity to see how a supplier and retailers change under different price elasticity. When the retailer's price elasticity is low, it is easier for a supplier to coordinate. In contrast, when price elasticity is high, the supplier's profit falls to insignificant levels, and it is challenging to improve margins by integrating the supply chain. When price elasticity is low, retailers' margins fall slightly after coordination. When price elasticity is high, coordination is associated with a significant increase in profit.

Chapter 1
Introduction 1
1.1
Research Background and Motivation 1
1.2
Research Purpose 3
1.3
Research Scope and Assumption 4
1.4
Thesis Structure 5
Chapter 2
Lit erature Review 9
2.1
Stackelberg Game 9
2.2
Inventory Management and Distribution Channel Coordination 10
2.3
Demand Function and Pricing Strategy 16
2.4
Lot sizing Algorithms 18
Chapter 3
Model Formulation and Analysis 21
3.1
Model Description 21
3.2
Notation 22
3.3
The NOC Mode l Construction 24
3.4
The OCI Model Construction 30
3.5
Summary 37
Chapte
r 4 Numerical Experiments 39
4.1
Parameter Settings 39
4.2
The Results for Supplier 41
4.3
The Results for Retailers 45
4.4
Case for the Market Factor 51
4.5
Summary 59
Chapter 5 Conclusions 61
5.1
Conclusions 61
5.2
Suggestions for Future Research 62

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