近年來，在經濟全球化的影響下，市場上之競爭日漸激烈，公司為維持競爭力，會試圖以投資活動擴展企業版圖，提升自身經營能力；而執行公司投資活動為管理階層之責任，因此當管理階層與公司股東利益不一致時，會導致代理問題的發生。過去文獻指出代理問題易使公司管理階層產生建立帝國誘因，遂管理階層容易因自利誘因執行次適之投資決策，進而影響公司投資效率，故本研究旨在探討管理階層建立帝國誘因與公司投資效率間之關聯性，並更進一步探討董事會效率對建立帝國行為的關係。本文選用2003年至2016上市上櫃公司為樣本，採用Benlemlih and Bitar (2016)之研究模型，探討管理階層建立帝國誘因與之公司投資無效率之關聯性。實證結果發現管理階層建立帝國誘因與公司投資無效率有正向顯著影響。然而，本研究進一步探討董事會監督機制的效果，是否會影響建立帝國誘因與投資效率的關聯性，實證結果發現，當董事會監督機制具有效性時，則建立帝國誘因對公司投資無效率之影響會減輕。總結上述，本研究推論，董事會監督機制具有強化公司治理的能力，有效的董事會治理可以減輕代理問題，即較大的董事會規模、董事會成員外部董事席次佔較大比率，能有效提升董事會之監督能力，使董事會具備有效性，降低管理者建立帝國之誘因所導致之公司投資無效率的情形。

The object of this study is to investigate the association between managerial empire building (MEB) and corporate investment efficiency using the data of listed firms from Taiwan Stock Exchange and Gretai Securities Market of over the period 2003 to 2016. This study employs a model developed by Benlemlih and Bitar (2016) to examine whether there is an impact on MEB to corporate investment efficiency. The results show that there is positive association between managerial empire building and investment inefficiency. Second, this study explores whether the board effectiveness will affect the relationship between MEB and investment inefficiency. The effectiveness of board monitoring mechanism is measured by board size, board ownership, chairman of the board and president, and the proportion of outside directors. The empirical results show that when there is an efficient board monitoring mechanism, the impact of MEB on the investment inefficiency will be reduced. Specifically, if the board size larger, the proportion of outside directors higher, CEO and the board of director non-overlapping, and higher board ownership, the impact of MEB to corporate inefficiency will actually be attenuated.

壹、 緒論 1
一、 研究動機 1
二、 研究流程 2
貳、 文獻回顧與探討 7
一、 管理階層建立帝國 7
(一).建立帝國(Empire Building) 7
(二).管理階層建立帝國誘因相關文獻 8
二、 投資效率決定因素 10
(一).財務報表品質 10
(二).公司治理 12
(三).政治連結關係 13
(四).管理階層職涯發展 13
三、 董事會之監督機制 14
(一).董事會持股比例 14
(二).總經理兼任董事長 15
(三).董事會規模 15
(四).獨立性 16
參、 假說發展與研究設計 19
一、 假說發展 19
二、實證模型建立 23
三、研究設計 25
(一).應變數 25
(二).自變數：建立帝國誘因(MEB) 25
(三).調節變項：董事會有效性(BD) 27
(四).控制變數 29
四、 樣本選擇與資料來源 35
肆、 實證結果分析 39
一、 敘述性統計 39
二、 相關係數分析 41
三、 實證結果 43
四、 額外測試 52
伍、 研究結論與建議 59
一、 研究結論與貢獻 59
二、 研究限制與未來研究建議 60
參考文獻 61

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