過去文獻指出PCAOB檢查將會提升審計品質(DeFond 2010; Fung, Raman and Zhu 2017)。鮮少有文獻探討PCOAB檢查對資本市場之實質經濟效果，故本研究檢測PCAOB檢查對銀行聯貸市場之影響，並假設PCAOB檢查會降低債權人所面臨之資訊風險，從而帶來聯貸市場債權結構與債務契約條款之改變。本研究以美國聯貸市場於2001至2010年PCAOB實行檢查後會計師事務所之借款客戶為測試樣本。本文之實證結果發現如下，首先，於會計師事務所之品質控管改採PCAOB檢查後，債權人將會給予債務人較低的貸款利率。再者，若會計師事務所於檢查報告中被開具缺失於“Part I Findings” and “Part II Findings”，債務人於債務契約簽訂中，將會顯著減少以會計數字為基準之財務條款，並且其被要求擔保品抵押之可能將顯著上升。本文之實證結果表明債務人將改變聯貸市場之債權結構與債務契約條款以回應PCAOB檢查之效果。

Prior studies provide empirical evidence that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection can improve audit quality (DeFond 2010; Fung, Raman, and Zhu 2017). However, there has limited research to examine the real economic effect of PCAOB inspections. Thus, this paper uses the U.S. syndicated loan data during periods from 2001 to 2010 as a setting. The results are summarized as follows. The regression results show that after auditors adopt PCAOB inspection, there is a significant decrease in spread. Second, when auditors get “Part I Findings” and “Part II Findings” in their inspection report, there is a significant reduction in the number of accounting-based financial covenants and the likelihood of requiring secured. Together, these findings indicate that lenders change in bank loan structure and contractual terms in response to the PCAOB inspection.

1. Introduction 1
2. Background and hypothesis development 7
2.1 Background 7
2.2 Hypothesis development 10
3. Research design and sample selection 15
3.1 Research design 15
3.2 Sample selection 18
4. Empiric results 19
4.1. Sample distribution and descriptive statistics 19
4.2. Changes in the retained rate of lead arranger(s) after audit firms adopt PCAOB inspection 20
4.3. Changes in price and non-price contractual terms after audit firms adopt PCAOB inspection 21
4.4. Changes in price and non-price contractual terms when auditors get “Part_ I_Findings” and “Part_ II_Findings” in their inspection report 23
5. Summary and conclusion 25
6. Reference 27
7. Appendix A 31

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