近年來關係人交易迭傳不止，如何更加完備公司治理越發受到重視，金管會亦積極推動設置審計委員會。本研究針對關係人交易的探討主要分為兩個面向，包括薪酬制度對於董事是否積極履行監督責任的影響，以及設置由獨立董事組成之審計委員會是否能發揮更好的監督效果。
本研究以2017年至2018年臺灣非金融業之上市公司，共1697個觀察值進行分析。分析結果顯示，薪酬與關係人交易呈現負向顯著關係，可能因低薪，董事以關係人交易作為薪酬補償工具。審計委員會之虛擬變數與關係人交易呈現正向顯著關係，意指，設有審計委員會之企業所揭露之關係人交易較多，可提供較可靠之財務報表。爾後，將樣本分為科技電子產業以及其他傳統產業以檢測審計委員會之特性。在科技電子產業中，審計委員會開會次數與關係人交易間具有正向顯著關係，表示當審計委員會開會次數越多，所揭露之關係人交易越多，審計委員會具有實質作用。在其他傳統產業中，審計委員會規模與關係人交易呈現負向顯著關係，表示當審計委員會之人數越多，關係人交易減少，公司治理機制較好。最後為審計委員會平均開會出席率與關係人交易呈現正向顯著關係，意味著當審計委員平均開會出席率越高時，獨立董事所揭露之關係人交易越多，可降低資訊不對稱之代理問題。因此，設置審計委會對其他傳統產業有一定影響力。

Related party transactions occur repeatedly in recent years. While making company governance more comprehensive has been strongly emphasized, Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C (Taiwan) has advocated to establish audit committees. This study looked into two main aspects that may have effect on related party transaction, including the role of the compensation system in shareholders’ active supervision and the performance of audit committee formed by independent directors.
This study is based on 1697 observations of non-financial listed firms in Taiwan during 2017-2018. We observed that compensation has negative significant influence on related party transactions. Lower compensation may be the reason why directors decide to seek private benefits by involving in related party transactions. The dummy variable representing the existence of audit committee has positive significant influence on related party transactions, suggesting that when a company establishes an audit committee may disclose more information and provide more reliable financial statements. Then the sample is categorized into the electronic industry and other traditional industries to reveal the characteristics of the audit committee. For the electronic industry, we observed that the frequency of committee meetings has positive significant influence on related party transactions. That means independent directors disclose more related party transactions on financial statement when the meeting frequency is higher. For other traditional industries, the results show that the size of audit committee has negative significant influence on related party transactions, which suggests that a larger audit committee may decrease related party transactions and represent better corporate governance. Lastly, the attendance of audit committee has positive significant influence on related party transactions, suggesting that when the attendance of committee is higher, independent directors may disclose more related party transactions on financial statements and decrease information asymmetry. Overall, the audit committee has considerable impact on traditional industries.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究架構及流程 4
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 7
第一節 關係人交易 7
第二節 薪酬契約與關係人交易 10
第三節 審計委員會與關係人交易 14
第三章 研究設計 21
第一節 樣本選取與資料來源 21
第二節 變數定義 23
第三節 實證模型 27
第四章 實證結果 29
第一節 敘述性統計 29
第二節 相關係數分析 31
第三節 實證結果分析 33
第四節 額外分析 41
第五章 討論與結論 49
第一節 討論 49
第二節 結論 50
參考文獻 51

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