競賽理論認為薪酬差距的增長幅度會影響員工的積極性，而員工行為則會反映在公司績效上，並指出薪酬差距對公司績效有良好之影響。先前相關研究皆圍繞在高階經理人上，近年來非主管階級員工也逐漸受到重視，因此本論文主要探討高階經理人與非主管階級員工間薪酬差距是否會影響公司績效。為了了解公司治理是否能扮演好監督之角色，能否對競賽理論產生作用，因此本論文以董事會及薪酬委員會衡量公司治理之有效性，探討公司治理如何對競賽理論產生效果。
本論文使用2018年及2019年台灣上市上櫃公司，共2,484個觀察值進行分析。結果發現，競賽理論亦適用在高階經理人與非主管階級員工之關係，兩者薪酬差距越大，將使公司績效越好。除此之外，研究結果表明，高階經理人與非主管階級員工間薪酬差距與公司績效之關係取決於公司治理之效果。表示擁有良好公司治理之環境，能夠增強競賽理論作用。

Tournament theory believes that the increase in the compensation gap will affect the enthusiasm of employees, and employee behavior will be reflected to firm performance, and shows that the compensation gap has a good impact on firm performance. Previous researches on tournament theory have investigated the compensation of executives. In recent years, non-managerial employees have gradually gained recognition. Therefore, this paper mainly discusses whether the compensation gap between executives and non-managerial employees affect firm performance. In order to realize whether corporate governance can play a good role in supervision and whether it can have an effect on tournament theory, this paper uses the board of directors and compensation committee to measure the effectiveness of corporate governance, and investigates how corporate governance has an effect on tournament theory.
Based on 2,484 firm-years observations for Taiwanese listed firms during 2018-2019. Results show that the tournament theory is also suitable for the relationship between executives and non-managerial employees. The greater the compensation gap between executives and non-managerial employees, the better the firm performance become. In addition, Results show that the compensation gap between executives and non-managerial employees and firm performance depends on the effect of corporate governance. It means that having a good corporate governance environment can enhance the role of tournament theory.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究架構及流程 5
第二章 文獻探討及假說建立 9
第一節 競賽理論模型 9
第二節 高階經理人間薪酬差距與公司績效 11
第三節 高階經理人與非主管階級員工間薪酬差距與公司績效 13
第四節 公司治理對薪酬差距與公司績效之影響 15
第三章 研究設計 19
第一節 研究樣本、研究期間及資料來源 19
第二節 變數定義 22
第三節 實證模型 26
第四章 實證結果 29
第一節 敘述性統計 29
第二節 相關係數分析 33
第三節 實證結果分析 35
第五章 討論與結論 43
第一節 討論 43
第二節 結論 45
第三節 管理意涵 46

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