本文使用Miles and Snow (1978, 2003)所建構的公司策略理論框架，來研究不同的公司策略對於從事避稅活動和盈餘管理活動的影響，並根據此關聯更進一步探討與公司財務績效的關係。本文的研究結果如下：第一，我們使用有效稅率來衡量企業的避稅活動，我們發現平均而言，攻擊者比起防守者與分析者，更顯著會從事避稅活動。第二，我們使用裁量性應計項與盈餘平穩來衡量企業的盈餘管理活動，平均而言，防守者比起攻擊者與分析者，不論是使用裁量性應計項或是盈餘平穩的方式，防守者都更顯著會從事盈餘管理活動。第三，根據以上結果，我們再深入探討不同策略選擇避稅或是盈餘管理活動時，對下一期財務績效的影響。結果顯示，攻擊者從事避稅活動，比起防守者與分析者從事避稅活動，攻擊者下一期的ROA顯著較低；防守者使用盈餘平穩進行盈餘管理，比起攻擊者與分析者，下一期的ROA沒有顯著較高。而防守者使用裁量性應計項進行盈餘管理，比起攻擊者與分析者，下一期的ROA會顯著較高。

This paper uses the corporate strategy theoretical framework constructed by Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) to find the impact of different corporate strategies on tax avoidance activities and earnings management activities, and further explores the relationship with corporate financial performance based on this association. The results of this study are as follows: First, we use effective tax rates to measure tax avoidance activities of firms. We find that on average, prospectors are more likely to engage in tax avoidance activities than defenders and analysts. Second, we use discretionary accruals and earnings smoothing to measure the firms' earnings management activities. On average, defenders compare to prospectors and analysts, whether they use discretionary accruals or earnings smoothing. Defenders are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. Third, based on the above results, we will further discuss the impact of different strategies on tax avoidance or earnings management activities on the corporate financial performance. The results show that the prospectors are engaged in tax avoidance activities. Compared with the defenders and analysts engaged in tax avoidance activities, the ROA of prospectors in the next period is significantly lower; the defenders use earnings smoothing for earnings management, the ROA of the next period is not significantly higher than others. The defender uses discretionary accruals for earnings management. Compared with attackers and analysts, the ROA of the next period will be significantly higher.

第一章 前言 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究架構與流程 6
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展 7
第一節 公司策略的發展 7
第二節 公司策略與避稅 8
第三節 公司策略與盈餘管理 10
第三章 研究方法 13
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 13
第二節 公司策略衡量 13
第三節 避稅程度衡量 15
第四節 盈餘管理衡量 16
第五節 控制變數衡量 18
第六節 研究模型設計 19
第四章 實證結果與分析 25
第一節 樣本分布 25
第二節 敘述統計與相關分析 25
第三節 公司策略對避稅的影響 27
第四節 公司策略對盈餘管理的影響 28
第五節 公司策略、避稅和盈餘管理對財務績效的影響 31
第五章 結論 35
參考文獻 37

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