在這篇文章中，我們將會定義四種不同形式的有效性指標，並且寫出它們抱怨形式，進而導出其兩種公設化形式及動態收斂過程。

In this paper, we will defne four diferent forms of effcient indexes, and their excess forms. Finally, for each of four effcient indexes, we
propose two axiomatic forms and dynamic convergence process leading to that corresponding effcient index.

1.緒論.................................................... 1

2.定義及符號............................................... 3

3.公設化 .................................................. 7

4.動態過程 ............................................... 23

5.參考文獻 ............................................... 29

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