本研究主要檢驗ESG績效對高階主管薪酬敏感度之影響。過去文獻指出ESG績效與財務之間呈正向關係，財務績效與高階主管薪酬之間為正向關係，因此本研究推論ESG績效增加，高階主管薪酬會增加。本研究以2016年至2020年台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，研究結果發現：第一，ESG績效與高階主管薪酬之間呈正向關係。第二，當公司為家族企業時，ESG績效與高階主管薪酬之間的關係不顯著。第三，隨著時間經過，金融機構投資人的持股比例會增加公司環境構面績效，從而使得高階主管的薪酬增加。

This study examines the relationship between ESG performance and executive compensation. Extant studies indicate that ESG performance has a significantly positive impact on financial performance, and financial performance has a positive association with executive compensation. Therefore, we posit that firms have higher ESG performance, and executive compensation will increase. This study tests Taiwan-listed companies from 2016 to 2020 and has three results. First, ESG performance and executive compensation have a positive relationship. Second, the relationship between ESG performance and executive compensation is not significant in a family firm. Third, when financial institutions have ownership, environmental performance has a positive association with executive compensation over time.

第一章　緒論　　 1
第二章　文獻回顧與假說建立　　 5
第三章　研究設計　　 13
第四章　實證結果　　 21
第五章　結論　　 29

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