本文以 2008 – 2021 年間台灣上市櫃公司作為樣本，探討於政府強制投保 D&O 保險前，公司風險 (系統性風險與獨特性風險) 與股權結構 (董監事持股比率、經理人持股比率與大股東持股比率) 如何影響公司 D&O 保險的投保傾向。接著使用差異中之差異法，探討於整個樣本期間，公司風險與股權結構對於公司財務績效的影響。本文的研究結果為：第一，與 D&O 保險有直接關聯的風險與經理人持股比率較高的公司傾向投保 D&O 保險；與 D&O 保險沒有直接關聯的大股東持股比率較高的公司不傾向投保 D&O 保險。第二，整體而言，政府有無強制公司投保 D&O 保險對於公司的財務績效並沒有顯著的影響。然而，我們發現對於政府強制要求投保才投保的公司而言，與 D&O 保險有直接關聯的獨特性風險與獨立董監事席次對於公司的經營績效有顯著的正向影響，董監事及經理人持股比率與市場績有顯著的正向影響，代表 D&O 保險會為公司帶來保護效果；與 D&O 保險沒有直接關聯的大股東持股比率對於市場績有顯著的負向影響，代表公司投保會降低大股東的監督機制，公司的監督會從大股東轉移到保險公司身上。

We investigate how corporate risk (includes: systemic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and shareholding structure (includes: director and supervisor shareholding ratio, manager shareholding ratio, and blockholder shareholding ratio) affect the propensity to purchase D&O insurance before the government mandates D&O insurance by using a sample of Taiwanese listed companies from 2008 to 2021. Then, using a difference-in-difference method, we investigate the impact of corporate risk and shareholding structure on the financial performance of companies throughout the sample period. We find that first, companies with higher risk and manager shareholding ratio directly related to D&O insurance tend to purchase D&O insurance; companies with higher blockholder shareholding ratio not directly related to D&O insurance do not tend to purchase D&O insurance. Second, overall, whether or not the government mandates D&O insurance does not have a significant impact on a company's financial performance. However, we find that for companies that are mandated by the government to purchase D&O insurance, idiosyncratic risk and the number of independent directors and supervisors directly related to D&O insurance have a significant positive impact on the company's operating performance, and the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors has a significant positive impact on the market performance, which means that D&O insurance has a protective effect on the company. The shareholding ratio of blockholders, which is not directly related to D&O insurance, has a significant negative impact on market performance, which means that the company's insurance will reduce the monitoring mechanism of major shareholders and the company's monitoring will be transferred from blockholders to the insurance company.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構與流程 7
第二章 文獻回顧與假說建立 9
第一節 風險與公司經營 9
第二節 股權結構與公司經營 10
第三節 D&O 保險對公司的影響 11
第四節 研究假說建立 12
第三章 研究方法 15
第一節 資料來源與樣本期間 15
第二節 主要變數的衡量 15
第三節 控制變數的衡量 16
第四節 研究方法與迴歸模型 18
第四章 實證結果與分析 27
第一節 樣本分配 27
第二節 敘述性統計與相關分析 29
第三節 主要變數對 D&O 保險的影響 32
第四節 風險與 D&O 保險對於公司財務績效的影響 33
第五節 股權結構與 D&O 保險對於公司財務績效的影響 35
第六節 獨立董監事席次與 D&O 保險對於公司財務績效的影響 37
第五章 結論 39
參考文獻 41

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