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作者:Joe Maganga Zonda
作者(英文):Joe Maganga Zonda
論文名稱:Essays in Macroeconomics
論文名稱(英文):Essays in Macroeconomics
指導教授:張銘仁
指導教授(英文):Ming-Jen Chang
口試委員:簡智崇
陳思寬
吳彥成
高一誠
口試委員(英文):Chih-Chung Chien
Shi-Kuan Chen
Yen-Chen Wu
Yi-Cheng Kao
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學號:810942002
出版年(民國):112
畢業學年度:111
語文別:英文
論文頁數:146
關鍵詞(英文):European UnionEconomic convergenceEconomic integrationEconomic growthInflation targetingEmerging markets and developing economiesMatrix completionSynthetic controlPolitical instabilitiesTreatment effectsSub-Saharan Africa
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Mainstream applied economics grapples with estimating the effects of economic, political interventions or events (treatments) of interest. The challenge in this realm of literature lies in the uncertainty regarding the best methodology that provides the most accurate estimate of the treatment effects. This is particularly due to the difficulty to simultaneously observe the outcome both with and without the treatment. This dissertation exploits two novel techniques in the program evaluation literature—the synthetic control (SC) and the matrix completion (MC) method—to investigate the treatment effects of two distinct events known to have profound macroeconomic consequences on the economies involved (Chapter 2 and 3), as well as a key monetary policy regime that has been extensively adopted by numerous central banks in the past three decades (Chapter 4). These econometric methods overcome two perennial econometric challenges: (i) endogeneities due to omitted variable biases; and (ii) country heterogeneities, which have grossly undermined the reliability of the prevailing estimates. This doctoral dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 sets the preamble by introducing the macroeconomic issues explored in the dissertation, providing a brief motivation for the econometric techniques employed, and summarizing the key findings. Chapter 5 concludes the doctoral dissertation.

Chapter 2 investigates the macroeconomic effects of EU enlargement using the SC method. We find that EU enlargement induces (heterogeneous) positive and significant effects on the new entrants, whereas the effects are largely unfavourable to the incumbent member states. Our results lend evidence for per capita income convergence hypothesis in the EU. We conduct a form σ- and β-convergence analysis using both the observed and synthetic data to confirm the latter evidence. The results from the latter inquiry reveal that EU enlargement enhances the speed of convergence by 50%.

Chapter 3, explores the economic costs of political instability (PI) events on 19 sub-Saharan African economies using both the SC and MC methods. Overall, we find that PI episodes significantly lower output levels by approximately 20 pp per year. Our results also suggest that the bulk (approximately 18 pp) of the output loss occurs in the short-run. Moreover, the output loss gradually exacerbate into the long-run leading to 26-28 pp loss in output relative to the counterfactual scenario of political tranquility. By virtue of deploying MC in parallel with SC estimator, we provide evidence that the MC estimator outperforms the latter in our empirical setting.

Chapter 4, evaluates the ex-post effects of inflation targeting (IT) monetary policy regime in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). Departing from the mainstream literature, we focus on the real (growth) effects of the regime thereby circumventing the “self-selection” bias problem. Overall, we unearth (heterogeneous) growth enhancing effects of IT in the targeting economies. We also find no statistical evidence to validate the salience of the so-called institutional preconditions for the efficient operationalization of IT regime. The latter evidence suggests that concerns over institutional immaturities in EMDEs are inflated and are to a greater extent unsubstantiated.
ABSTRACT ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2 MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EU INTEGRATION 5
2.1 Introduction.................................... 5
2.2 Econometric strategy ............................... 9
2.2.1 Synthetic control method......................... 9
2.3 Data and sample.................................. 11
2.4 Empirical results ................................. 12
2.4.1 Results for the NMS-13 ......................... 12
2.4.2 Results for EU-13 states ......................... 17
2.4.3 A tide that lifts some boats........................ 21
2.5 Inference and robustness checks ......................... 22
2.5.1 Inference ................................. 22
2.5.1.1 In-timeplacebotest ...................... 23
2.5.1.2 In-spaceplacebotest...................... 23
2.5.2 Further robustness checks ........................ 23
2.5.2.1 Sensitivity of per capita GDP results to PWT vintage: . . . . 24
2.5.2.2 Impact of euro adoption: ..... 25
2.6 Economic convergence analysis ......................... 28
2.6.1 Sigma(σ)-convergence.......................... 29
2.6.2 Beta(β)-convergence........................... 31
2.7 Conclusion .................................... 34
Appendix A.1................................. ... 35
Appendix A.2...................................... 40
Appendix A.3...................................... 41
CHAPTER 3 MACROECONOMIC COSTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITIES 43
3.1 Introduction.................................... 43
3.2 Econometric strategy ............................... 46
3.2.1 Synthetic control ............................. 47
3.2.2 The matrix completion estimator..................... 48
3.2.3 Comparison between SC and MC frameworks. . . . . .. . . . . . . 48
3.3 Data and case study identification ........................ 50
3.3.1 Case study identification strategy .................... 50
3.3.1.1 Treated countries ....................... 52
3.3.1.2 Control countries ....................... 52
3.3.2 Data.................................... 54
3.4 Results....................................... 56
3.4.1 Synthetic control ............................. 56
3.4.2 MC estimator............................... 57
3.4.2.1 MC estimator: case studies .................. 58
3.4.2.2 MC estimator: ATT for all treated countries . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Robustness and placebo exercises ........................ 63
3.5.1 Synthetic control ............................. 63
3.5.1.1 In-space placebo test...................... 63
3.5.1.2 In-time placebo test ...................... 64
3.5.2 MC estimator............................... 65
3.5.2.1 Tests for no pre-trend ..................... 65
3.5.2.2 Stable unit treatment value assumption . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Conclusion .................................... 70
Appendix B....................................... 71
CHAPTER 4 MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF INFLATION TARGETING MONETARY POLICY 73
4.1 Introduction.................................... 73
4.2 IT regime: stylized facts ............................. 77
4.3 Econometric strategy ............................... 80
4.3.1 The framework.............................. 80
4.3.2 Diagnostics................................ 83
4.3.2.1 In-space placebo tests ..................... 83
4.4 Data and sample.................................. 84
4.4.1 Data.................................... 84
4.4.2 Treated and donor units.......................... 85
4.4.3 Sample period .............................. 87
4.5 Results and inference............................... 87
4.5.1 Baselineresults.............................. 87
4.5.1.1 Results for African economies ................ 88
4.5.1.2 Results for Asian economies ................. 90
4.5.1.3 Results for European economies ............... 92
4.5.1.4 Results for LAC economies.................. 93
4.6 Inference and robustness tests........................... 95
4.6.1 In-space placebo tests .......................... 95
4.6.2 Alternative donor pool specification ................... 98
4.6.3 Alternative variant of SC algorithm ................... 101
4.7 Correlates of GDP per capita gains........................ 104
4.8 Conclusion .................................... 107
Appendix C.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix C.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix C.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 115
BIBLIOGRAPHY 119


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